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Abstract
The first pillars of social security systems widely differ across European
countries both in the contribution rate and intra-generational redistribution.
What would be the impact of these differences if EU citizens had free access
to all systems ? This paper aims to highlight some basic features of this
question in a very simple two countries model.
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1 Introduction
Most European countries have set up a mandatory unfunded pension
scheme, often called first pillar, financed through contributions levied on
wages. Although this common characteristic is crucial, the systems signifi-
cantly differ in two dimensions at least. First, although benefit rules have
evolved, systems can still be classified as they were at their set up : some are
mostly ”Bismarckian” with individuals’ pensions that are earnings-related,
while others are mostly ”Beveridgean” with flat pensions. Second, the level
of the mandatory contributions - hence the level of the pension benefits -
strongly varies across countries. For example, this level represented in 2003
roughly 9% of the GDP in the United Kingdom, 16, 5% in France, 19, 5% in
Germany, and 32.7% in Italy2. Thus, the redistribution carried out within a
generation and the level of the contributions are two major characteristics
that differentiate European systems. Currently the minimal contributing
period necessary to give pension rights is long, thereby limiting the ”por-
tability” of the systems. This limitation constitutes a barrier to workers’
mobility, which may slow down labor integration, a major objective of the
EU.
There are various ways to diminish the impact of such barriers. One
is harmonization. Given the current differences in the systems and the pro-
blems of transition, agreement on a common system or even on steps toward
convergence can only be slow. Another somewhat indirect but potentially
2Cross countries comparisons are however rather hazardous, and vary according to
the definition of social security. In line with the objectives of the paper, I have tried to
consider only the first pillars the systems. Data for France, Germany, and Italy are taken
in http ://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2004-2005/europe/guide.html. The
same document gives 23, 8% for UK, but it includes the second pillar, which is also man-
datory but funded. For a description of the UK system see the European Commission and
the Council Joint report Adequate and sustainable Pensions (2003).
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powerful way to influence social security systems is ”free choice”. By free
choice, I mean to let any EU citizen to choose the system of any EU country
without moving. Owing to the differences in the social security taxes and the
benefit rules, free choice could trigger a drastic change in the allocation of
individuals between the various systems. Would all systems survive ? What
would be the impact on efficiency, redistribution, and ultimately on citizens
welfare ?
The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions in a model as
simple as possible while still accounting for the basic features just outlined.
The analysis is limited to two countries with identical fundamentals. Eco-
nomies are modeled as overlapping generation models so as to discuss the
trade-off between physical investment and direct inter-generational transfers
such as performed by unfunded systems. To account for intra-generational
redistribution, workers within a generation differ in their productivity. The
growth rate of population and rate of return on investment are exogenous
and constant over time.
An unfunded social security system is in place in each country, man-
datory for its citizens. A system is characterized by two parameters, the
contribution rate on earnings, and the ”bismarckian” factor that determines
the intra-generational redistribution operated by the system3. Even though
the economies are identical, these parameters may differ in the two coun-
tries, to account of the stylized facts referred to above. I investigate the
situation in which the citizens of both countries can freely choose either
system, without having to move.
What effect may have free choice ? Roughly speaking, the choice of an
individual is determined by comparing the ”rates of return” expected from
each system (Aaron [1966]). Two factors influence this comparison. Not sur-
3I use here the modeling of Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000).
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prisingly, a first factor is related to the efficiency of inter-generational trans-
fers (Samuelson [1958], Gale [1973]). If the growth rate of the population is
less than the rate of return on investment for example, efficiency considera-
tions favor the system with the lower contribution rate. The second factor
is the redistribution operated within each system. In contrast to efficiency,
redistribution affects individuals in a differential way according to their ear-
nings. Furthermore the effective redistribution within a system is influenced
not only by its design -bismarckian factor and contribution rate- but also by
the distribution of earnings of its contributors (even a beveridgean system
operates no redistribution if earnings are all equal). This is a crucial point to
understand free choice since the contributors to each system are no longer
determined by nationality.
Under free choice, individuals’ choices affect the redistribution levels wi-
thin each system, which in turn determine on individuals’ choices. A simple
example illustrates this interaction. Let contribution rates be equal in the
two countries, one system be beveridgean and the other be bismarckian.
Initially, in the absence of liquidity constraints, workers with wages smaller
than the average one are better off in the beveridgean system than in the bis-
marckian. At the opening of the systems, presumably, low-income workers
choose the beveridgean system, and the wealthy workers the bismarckian
one (as is surely true if they base their choice on the initial situation). If this
is the case however, the average contributors’ earnings to the beveridgean
system will diminish (and that to the bismarckian will raise). As a result,
the effective redistribution within the beveridgean system decreases and the
initial incentives to choose it is reduced.
To assess the full impact of free choice, this paper considers a steady
state equilibrium. The wage distribution of the contributors to each system
is constant overtime, determined by the choices of individuals who correctly
4
expect the returns of each system for them (the so-called rational expecta-
tions hypothesis). I show that a (not necessarily unique) equilibrium always
exists. Furthermore several types of equilibria may occur depending on whe-
ther one or both systems are active and which system is chosen by the high
income workers. I investigate how the various parameters -characteristics of
the systems, population growth rate, return to investment, wage dispersion-
influence the equilibrium type.
If both systems cannot be active in equilibrium, one system will be selec-
ted in the long run by all citizens and the other will be de facto eliminated.
How to interpret this result ? To suppose as in this paper that the opening of
the systems would take place without any adjustment in their characteris-
tics is not very realistic. The result nevertheless suggests that if the systems
cannot be both active, adjustments must be sufficiently fast in order to
avoid one system to be eliminated. Allowing for fast adjustments may be an
even more unrealistic assumption owing to the current important differences
between systems and the strong resistance to reforms.
The question addressed by this paper is political. The opening of systems
limits the marges de manoeuvre of a ”country”. The analysis however dif-
fers from the approach initiated by Browning (1975), and referred to as the
political approach to social security. Its purpose is to explain the characte-
ristics of a system by considering various decision-making processes, such as
planner, median voter, lobbies (see for example the review by Galasso and
Porfeta (2002)). This paper clearly differs since its goal is to analyze the in-
teraction between different systems taking the characteristics of the systems
as ”given”, inherited from the past. On this respect, the closest analysis to
ours is that of Casarico (2000). She also looks at the specific problem of inte-
gration and pension systems, with a focus that is somewhat complementary
to ours. A more precise comparison is given after the analysis of the model.
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Also, the impact of national pay-as-you-go (payg) systems on the in-
dividuals’ decisions to migrate has been examined by several authors (e.g.
Hombourg and Richter [1993], Breyer and Kolmar [2002]). Individuals must
contribute to the system where they live, and may differ only by a migration
cost. Thus, in contrast with our analysis, redistribution is not an issue, and
the driving force explaining why people move is the differences in (endoge-
nous) population growth and interest rate across countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
Section 3 determines the initial situation when a mandatory system is in
place within each country. Section 4 studies equilibrium configurations when
the two systems are opened to the citizens of both countries. Some dynamics
are considered in Section 5. Proofs are gathered in the final section.
2 The model
In what follows, I consider two countries, denoted by A and B, with the
same economy but with a different pension system.
2.1 The economy in a country
The economy in each country is described by the same overlapping ge-
nerations model, with a structure close to that of Diamond (1965).
Each generation lives for two periods, there is a single good that can be
either consumed or invested, and population grows at a constant rate g− 1.
An individual works only during the first period of his life, with an inelastic
supply normalized to 1.
The technology of production is linear with marginal productivities of
capital and labor that are constant over time. The quantity of good available
at date t results from the return on investment at the previous period and
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from labor of the current young generation. An amount s of capital inves-
ted in period t − 1 will produce rs units of good in period t where r is the
exogenous return to investment. As for labor, workers differ in their produc-
tivity/wages w : A w-worker denotes someone who produces and earns w.
Wages are distributed on [wmin, wmax] with a mean denoted by w. Thus the
total quantity of good available at date t per head of old agents is gw+rst−1
if st−1 was the average quantity invested in period t − 1. The distribution
of wages is assumed to be continuous, constant across generations.
Individuals’ preferences bear on consumption levels when young and old,
denoted by cj and cv (there is no altruism motive), and are strictly increasing
in each argument. Preferences may be heterogeneous.
I shall assume away liquidity constraints. This assumption allows one
to conduct the analysis without specifying preferences, by working with
intertemporal wealth only. More precisely let us consider an individual who
receives labor income net of contributions, (1−τ)w, in the first period of his
life, and expects to receive a pension benefit pi in the second period (dropping
unnecessary time index). He faces the following successive constraints :
cy + s = (1− τ)w and co = sr + pi (1)
where s is an investment if positive and a loan if negative. They imply :
cy + co/r = (1− τ)w + τ pi
r
. (2)
In other words, the discounted value of consumption levels is equal to the
intertemporal wealth, defined as the value of net labor income plus the
discounted rights to pension. Conversely, in the absence of constraint on s,
the intertemporal constraint (2) describes all feasible consumption plans :
(1) and (2) are equivalent.4
4The pension may not be correctly anticipated (even though we will require it to be at
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Thus, in the absence of liquidity constraints, the welfare of an individual
varies as his intertemporal wealth. As a result, the impact of a pay-as-you-go
system on an individual’s welfare can be analyzed through the impact on
wealth. Similarly, the choice between two systems is determined by compa-
ring the wealth values expected from contributing to either system.
Remarks.
1. Growth in productivity/wages can be introduced in the usual way, by
interpreting g − 1 as the growth rate of the aggregate wage bill.
2. The assumption of a linear technology excludes endogenous variations
in productivity, as would obtain with a non linear production function. Rela-
ted to this, the absence of liquidity constraints makes sense only if aggregate
savings are positive (see also footnote 6).
3. The ratio workers to retirees, equal to g, is exogenous. This ratio
is however sensitive to some policies, especially to Social Security. Labor
participation changes overtime, owing to changes in legislation affecting the
choice of retirement date, or the number of working hours for instance.
Also it has been suggested that life expectancy and fertility are influenced
by Social Security (see Philipson and Becker [1983] and De la Croix and
Doepke [2003] for instance). These aspects are not addressed here.
2.2 Characteristics of a pension system
At the ”initial” situation, a pension system is in place in each country,
mandatory for its citizens. Once systems are opened, each young indivi-
dual will be able to choose between the two systems. This section describes
the functioning of a system without specifying who contributes to it (and
dropping unnecessary country index).
equilibrium). The only assumption that is needed is that the anticipation is single-valued :
the young individual makes decisions as if he will receive pi for sure.
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A system is unfunded (payg), characterized by two parameters specifying
the contribution rate, τ , and the redistribution ”bismarckian” factor α.
Contributions are levied on wages, with a constant rate τ : a young w-
worker contributes τw. By construction, the system is balanced. Thus, at
date t, given wt the average wage level of the contributors to the system and
gt the number of contributors per pensioner, the average pension benefits
per pensioner, pit, is equal to :
pit = τgtwt. (3)
The bismarckian factor determines the benefit rule, which relates the pen-
sion benefits of a specific pensioner to the contributions he made in the
previous period. Let us consider a pensioner at t who earned w at period
t− 1 while the average wage over the contributors to the system was wt−1.
He thus contributed w/wt−1 times the average level of contributions. If the
bismarckian factor is α the pensioner receives benefits given by5
piw,t = (α
w
wt−1
+ (1− α))pit. (4)
A pensioner whose contribution was equal to the average contribution per
capita, w = wt−1, receives benefits equal to the average benefits per pen-
sioner, pit, whatever value for α. Note that for α = 0 all pensioners receive
this level, independently of the amount of their previous contributions : the
system is Beveridgean. At the opposite, a Bismarckian system obtains for
α = 1, since pension benefits are proportional to contributions. Thus, for
α between 0 and 1, the system combines a Beveridgean system and a Bis-
marckian one. This is a crude description of the current systems, which are
5The benefit rule can also be written as
piw,t
w
= (α+ (1− α)wt−1
w
)
pit
wt−1
,
which shows how replacement rates vary with income.
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much more complex (see for example the Whitehouse report on nine OECD
countries).
3 Pension systems
Initially, each young worker contributes to the mandatory pension system
of his country. I consider the steady state situation, in which the system is
in place and is expected to remain in place. After examining a country, I
draw some brief comparisons between distinct systems.
3.1 National systems
Let us consider a country with a system characterized by the parameters
(τ, α). While in place, the average level of wages of the contributors is w. Also
the numbers of contributors per pensioner is equal to g. This gives gt = g,
and wt−1 = wt = w at a steady state, Therefore, from expressions (3) and
(4), a w-worker will receive a pension benefit equal to [αw + (1 − α)w]τg.
Plugging this value into (2) gives the value for intertemporal wealth :
W (w) = [1 + τ(
g
r
− 1)]w + τ g
r
(1− α)(w − w). (5)
Note that in the absence of a payg system, wealth would be simply equal
to the wage w. Thus, the system has a positive impact on an individual if
W (w) is larger than w. To highlight the impact of each characteristic, it is
convenient to define
R = 1 + τ(
g
r
− 1) and D = τ g
r
(1− α). (6)
With this notation, wealth writes as W (w) = Rw +D(w − w).
The factor R can be described as the rate of return of the system at
the steady state situation : whatever value for α, average wealth is equal to
Rw whereas, without a payg system, it would be equal to average wage w.
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Furthermore, in the absence of redistribution, the wealth of a w-worker is
given by Rw for any wage w. Thus, each individual benefits from the system6
if the rate R is larger than 1, that is if the growth rate of the population
is larger than the rate of return on investment, and each one is hurt by the
system in the opposite case of a rate R less than 1. In other words,
at steady states, a bismarckian payg system makes every indivi-
dual better off if g > r and everyone worse off if g < r.
The distinction between the two cases is well known since Gale (1973), who
referred to them respectively as the ”Samuelson” and ”classical” case.
In the presence of redistribution, the analysis remains valid ”on average”
since average wealth is Rw. In addition to Rw, the wealth of a w-worker is
affected by a term stemming from redistribution, D(w − w), positive for
wages less than the average and negative otherwise. As a result, even if
g < r, a system can nevertheless be beneficial to some low-income workers,
or, at the opposite, even if g > r, a system can be detrimental to some
high-income workers. Since the redistribution term is proportional to D, the
factor D determines the extent of the redistribution. Note that D depends
not only on the bismarckian factor, but also on the contribution rate and
the ratio g/r.
3.2 Comparing systems
Even though the two countries, denoted by A and B, have the same eco-
nomy -identical population growth, return to investment, and wage distribution-
6 The argument cannot be extended too much : it cannot be deduced from expression
(6) that, if g > r, increasing the rate of contribution always leads to a Pareto improve-
ment. Beyond a certain contribution rate, no young individual saves, which invalidates
the approach by intertemporal wealth. To treat this question correctly, the return on ca-
pital must be endogenous, determined by a production function. Then, the rate of return
becomes larger than population growth if saving/investment is sufficiently low.
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their systems may differ significantly, hence have a different impact on citi-
zens welfare.
The characteristics of the system in country I = A,B are denoted by
(τ I , αI). From (6), the rate of return to system I and the extent of the
redistribution are given by
RI = 1 + τ I(
g
r
− 1) and DI = τ I g
r
(1− αI) (7)
and the wealth of a w-worker in country I is
W I(w) = RIw +DI(w − w). (8)
In the Samuelson case, g > r, the system that has the highest rate of return
is the one with the largest contribution rate. In the classical case, it is the
opposite. From now on, the system that has the highest rate of return will
be referred to as the more efficient system. This is justified as follows.
In the absence of redistribution, the welfare of citizens in different coun-
tries but with the same wage w is easily compared through their wealth
RIw. Hence, at the steady state with bismarckian systems, a w-worker is
better off in the country that has the highest rate of return RI .
In the presence of redistribution, the average wealth of the citizens is lar-
ger in the country with the largest return. Thus, with adequate transfers, all
contributors to the less efficient system could be made better off by changing
their contribution rate to that of the other country (that is decreasing it in
the classical case, and increasing it in the Samuelson case). Note that there
is an important difference between the two cases if one considers, instead
of steady states, the transition from the less to the more efficient system.
Whereas in the Samuelson case, every individual can be made better off,
in the classical case, g < r, surely some individuals have to be hurt in a
transition toward the more efficient system (by similar arguments as used
in the seminal paper of Gale [1973]),
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4 Equilibrium under free choice
This section considers the situation in which each country opens its social
security system to any citizen of the other country. More precisely, each
young worker must contribute to a social security system, but can freely
choose between the two systems without moving. The choice, necessarily
made when young, is once for all.
To choose between system A or B, a w-worker evaluates the wealth that
he expects from each. Let us spell out this evaluation. The pension that
is anticipated from a system depends on the wage level of its current and
next contributors, and on the growth rate of the number of contributors,
Current wages determine the future redistributive gains or losses within a
system, and next wages together with the growth rate determine the level
of pension benefits. Let wIt−1 and wIt be the anticipated average wage of
the young contributors to system I at the current period t − 1 and the
subsequent period t, and gIt −1 be the anticipated growth rate of the number
of contributors. According to (3) and (4), a w-worker will expect pension
benefits equal to
[αI
w
wIt−1
+ (1− αI)]τ IgItwIt ,
from contributing to system I. This yields the level of intertemporal wealth :
(1− τ I)w + τ I g
I
t
r
[αIw + (1− αI)wIt−1]
wIt
wIt−1
. (9)
We look for a stationary equilibrium, which requires two conditions
(1) in each system, the number of contributors grows at a constant rate
equal to that of the population, and the average wage of the contributors is
constant over time, and
(2) individuals base their choices on these variables, which are correctly
expected.
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Before making this definition more precise, it is convenient to analyze
the choices of individuals who have (not necessarily correct) stationary ex-
pectations.
4.1 The system that is more favorable to high-income
The analysis of individuals’ choices assuming stationary and identical
expectations leads to a simple typology of the systems. Under stationary
expectations, individuals expect the same types of workers to choose the
systems at the current and next period. Thus, they expect the number of
contributors to each system to grow as the population, gIt = g, and the
average wage of the contributors to each system to be constant overtime
wIt = w
I
t−1 for I = A,B. Let us denote by wI this constant expectation.
From (9) and using the expressions (7) of RI and DI , the intertemporal
wealth expected by a w-worker from contributing to system I is :
W I(wI , w) = RIw +DI(wI − w). (10)
The choice of a system is made accordingly, by comparing the wealth values
for A and B, namely by the sign of
WA(wA, w)−WB(wB, w) = [(RA−DA)− (RB −DB)]w+DAwA−DBwB
The key point is that this expression is linear with respect to wage w, and
that expected levels wA and wB do not affect the slope but only the level.
Assume the slope to be positive (In the sequel, we exclude the degenerate
case in which the slope is null). Then, if an individual prefers A to B, all
those who earn more than him also prefer A to B. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition. System A is said to be more favorable to high-income than
system B if
[RA −DA]− [RB −DB] > 0
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which, replacing the RI and DI by their expressions, is equivalent to
τA(1− g
r
αA) < τB(1− g
r
αB). (11)
System A is less favorable to high-income than B if the inequalities are re-
versed. Under stationary and identical expectations, the workers who choose
the system the more favorable to high-income are those whose wage is larger
than a given threshold.
Which system is the more favorable is determined by the difference in
efficiency, as measured by RA−RB, relative to the difference in the extent of
redistribution, as measured by DA −DB. If both systems are bismarckian,
there is no redistribution whatsoever, and the system the more favorable to
high-income is the more efficient one. More interesting is the case of systems
that differ in their redistribution. It is worth recalling that, in Europe, sys-
tems with rather flat benefits tend to be associated with low contribution
rates. Thus consider the case where the system with the smaller bismarckian
factor, say B, has the smaller contribution rate : αA > αB and τA > τB.
From (11), the system the more favorable to high-income is the one with the
lowest product τ I(1−αIg/r). Thus, under neutrality for example, g = r, the
more bismarckian system A is not necessarily the more favorable to high-
income. As the ratio g/r decreases, the more inefficient a payg system is,
and the more likely it is that the system with the lower contribution rate is
the more favorable to high-income workers.
4.2 Example
To illustrate this point, let us consider the case of France (A) and United
Kingdom (B). The tax rate in UK is roughly half that in France, τA/τB ≈ 2.
Also, the UK system is much more redistributive than the french system.7
7This remark does not account for the reform which has just been decided in France.
Indeed the minimum level for pension benefits has been increased up to 85% of the mini-
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According to some data, the parameters αA = 0.8 and αB = 0.2 are rea-
sonable. The threshold value of g/r that determines whether A is more
favorable to high income than B is 1/1.4 ≈ 0.7. This gives that
for g/r > 1,A is more efficient and more favorable to high income thanB,
for 1 > g/r > 0.7, A is less efficient but more favorable to high income
than B, and for
g/r < 0.7, A is less efficient and less favorable to high income than B.
Thus, the UK system, although much more redistributive than the french
system, can be more favorable to high-income thanks to its low contribution
rate. This is especially true if payg systems are perceived as inefficient.
Not surprisingly, the ratio of growth rate to investment return plays a
crucial role. Which value for this ratio is reasonable ? This is quite a delicate
question because it is not clear which return should be chosen for r. A period
here represents roughly thirty years. If one takes for r the return on the stock
market since the second world war, and for g the projected growth rate of
aggregate wage bill, the compounding effect will give a low value for g/r.
This is however related to the equity premium puzzle. If indeed individuals
are risk averse and ready to pay a high risk premium, then one should
take for r a much smaller value than the stock market return. Also, a payg
system provides retirees with an annuity, thereby insuring them against the
risk of living old. Making insurance compulsory avoids the usual problems
encountered in markets with asymmetric information. As documented by
various studies, the premium associated to the longevity risk is roughly 5%
(see Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba [2001]). To account for this premium, an
extra return on a payg could be introduced. Due to these difficulties and the
uncertainty on future, I shall discuss in next section equilibria for different
mal wage. For a rather large fraction of low-income earners, this constraint may become
binding, which would make the French system more beveridgean than previously. I thank
Thomas Piketty for having mentioned this point to me.
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values of g/r.
4.3 Equilibrium
Given an anticipated average wage wI of the contributors to each system
I, let w∗ be the wage level defined by WA(wA, w∗) −WB(wB, w∗) = 0. To
fix the idea, assume system A to be more favorable to high-income. The
individuals who choose system A are those who earn more than w∗. Note
that the threshold w∗ may not be in the range of wages. If w∗ ≤ wmin for
example, all individuals choose A, and if w∗ ≥ wmax, all choose B.
Individuals’ anticipation on contributors’ average wages determine their
choices, which in turn determine the realized wages. To get an equilibrium,
anticipation and realization must be consistent. This leads to the definition :
Definition. Let system A be more favorable to high-income than B. An
equilibrium is determined by average wages wA and wB, and w∗ that satisfy
WA(wA, w∗)−WB(wB, w∗) = 0 and the expectations conditions :
- if w∗ is in ]wmin, wmax[ : wA = E[w|w ≥ w∗], wB = E[w|w ≤ w∗]
both systems are active and the equilibrium is called an AB-equilibrium
- if w∗ ≤ wmin : wA = w,wB = wmin
only system A is active and the equilibrium is called an A-equilibrium,
- if w∗ ≥ wmax : wA = wmax, wB = w
only system B is active and the equilibrium is called a B-equilibrium.
For an active system, the expectation condition says that the anticipation
of the average wage of the contributors to an active system is ”correct”
equal to its expectation conditional on individuals’ choices.8 For an inactive
8Note that the wage distribution being identical in the two countries, the wage distri-
bution in the union of the two countries is identical to that of a single country.Thus, if
only I is active, wI = w.
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system, the condition needs a justification : since there are no contributors,
the conditional expectation of their average wage is not well defined. Hence
individuals’ behaviors are supported by some ”beliefs” about this wage.9 In
the above definition, the beliefs are those justified by a perfect equilibrium
argument. If the set of contributors to B is small for example, it is formed by
the individuals whose wages are close to the minimum. Taking the limit, if
only A is active, the belief on wB is the minimum wage. A similar argument
justifies that with only B active, the belief on wA is set to the maximum
wage.
Before going further it is helpful to note that the system the less favo-
rable to high-income is eliminated whenever it is also the less efficient. The
intuition is clear. Suppose there is an AB-equilibrium and consider a w∗-
worker who is indifferent between A and B (a similar argument shows that
a B-equilibrium does not exist by considering workers with wage wmax). By
choosing A, the worker would benefit from the larger efficiency return pro-
vided by A. Furthermore, since the wage w∗ is not greater than wA, he can
only benefit from redistribution in A instead of being penalized by it in B :
he definitely prefers A to B, a contradiction. The analysis is more complex
if, from the point of view of low-income workers, efficiency and redistribu-
tion benefits enter into conflict. The following proposition characterizes the
equilibrium configurations in function of the parameters.
Proposition 1. Let system A be more favorable to high-income than B.
There exists
9A referee objects that a young individual can choose a system that has no retirees,
say B, and get pension benefits when old for free. It is true only if next period, a young
will indeed agree to contribute to B. Looking at intertemporal wealth, which amounts at
considering stationary behavior, precisely accounts for this requirement.
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– an A-equilibrium if and only if
WA(w,wmin)−RBwmin ≥ 0⇔ RB −RA ≤ DAw − wmin
wmin
(12)
– a B-equilibrium if and only if
WB(w,wmax)−RAwmax ≥ 0⇔ DBwmax − w
wmax
≤ RB −RA (13)
– an AB-equilibrium if
either an A and a B equilibrium both exist : (12) and (13) hold
or no one exists : neither (12) nor (13) holds.
It follows that an equilibrium always exists. As already said, it can only be
an A-equilibrium if A is more efficient : (12) holds but not (13) if RB ≤ RA.
Otherwise, the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution for low income
or top income workers determines equilibrium configurations. To see this, let
us explain how the equilibrium conditions are obtained. To check whether A
alone can be in equilibrium, assume that A is chosen by every worker. The
average wage wA is equal to the overall mean w. To form an equilibrium,
it suffices that workers whose wages are close to the minimum level wmin
have no incentives to subscribe to B. This gives condition (12), which results
from the following trade-off. By subscribing to B, on one hand wmin-workers
lose all the redistribution benefits in A without getting any in B (because
wages in B are roughly identical), but on the other hand they benefit from
the larger return in B (assumed to be more efficient). If the loss outweighs
the efficiency gain, an A−equilibrium is obtained. Since the larger the ratio
w/wmin is, the larger the loss in redistributive benefits, a low value for the
minimum wage makes more likely an A-equilibrium to exist. Similarly a
large value for the extent of the redistribution in A (subject of course to A
be more favorable to high income) makes more likely an A-equilibrium to
exist.
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Similarly, a B-equilibrium is obtained if workers whose wages are close
to the maximum level wmax have no incentives to subscribe to A, which
gives condition (13). The condition is strong : it requires that top income
workers are better off by subscribing to system B applied to the whole
population rather than by subscribing to A without redistribution loss. As
the ratio wmax/w and the extent of the rredistribution in B increase, the
redistribution losses for a top income worker subscribing to B rather than
to A outweighs the efficiency gains : B alone is in equilibrium only for a
small enough ratio and small value for DB.
Note that the above arguments are valid whatever the assumption on
the distribution of earnings, whether continuous or not : only the incentives
of the top or bottom income workers matter.10 This insight is likely to be
quite robust and to extend to more general benefit rules.
According to this discussion, as the range of wages is enlarged, the redis-
tribution effects become predominant and determine the equilibrium. Wor-
kers who most benefit from redistribution and those who are the more pe-
nalized by it are both encouraged to choose the system the more favorable
to high income : for sufficiently low wmin and sufficiently large wmax, only
condition (12) holds. This gives :
Corollary. The system the more favorable to high-income is the only active
at equilibrium if the range of wages is sufficiently large.
Instead, various equilibrium configurations are possible when the dispersion
of wages is not too large and the system the less favorable to high income is
the more efficient. Even the three types of equilibrium can simultaneously
10With a discrete distribution, the condition for an I-equilibrium to exist is identical.
The AB equilibria may be a little bit different : some may be semi-pooling, meaning that
individuals with the same wage choose distinct systems (of course they must be indifferent
between both.
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exist. As long as redistribution or efficiency is not dominant factor, the
incentives conditions, as given by (12) and (13) are to some extent inde-
pendent : one bears on incomes at the bottom and the other at the top.
This is illustrated by the subsequent example.
4.4 Example (continued)
Consider again the illustrative case in which αA > αB and τA > τB. We
know that when one system is both more efficient and more favorable to high
income than the other, it is the only active at equilibrium. It immediately
follows that only the more beveridgean system B is active if payg systems
are sufficiently inefficient, while it is the more bismarckian system A if they
are sufficiently efficient.11 Taking the values of the France-UK example in
Section 2, this gives that
- for g/r > 1, an A-equilibrium obtains because system A is more efficient
and more favorable to high income than B,
- for g/r < 0.7, a B-equilibrium obtains because A is less efficient and
less favorable to high income than B.
It remains to determine what happens when efficiency and redistribution
enter into conflict, which occurs here for 1 > g/r > 0.7 : A is more favorable
to high-income but less efficient than B. The case g/r = 0.8 is illustrated in
figure 1.
In the top graph, the dashed line represents RBw−WA(w,w) as a func-
tion of w. According to (12), there is an A-equilibrium if it is negative
at wmin, that is if wmin < a ≈ 0.6. Similarly, the normal line represents
WB(w,w) − RAw, and according to (13), there is a B-equilibrium if it is
positive at wmax, which gives wmax < b ≈ 1.5. The difference in wealth, at
11The first case holds if both inequalities, g < r and τB(1 − αBg/r) < τA(1 − αAg/r)
hold, and the second if both inequalities are reversed.
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Fig. 1 – Parameters : τA/τB = 2, αA = 0.8, αB = 0.2, g/r = 0.8, w = 1.
Top graph : The horizontal axis represents w, the vertical one differences in
wealth, multiplied by 100. The thick line represents WA(w, .) −WB(w, .),
the dashed line RBw−WA(w,w) (there is an A−equilibrium if wmin < a ≈
0.6) and the normal line : WB(w,w) − RAw (there is a B−equilibrium if
wmax < b ≈ 1.5)
Bottom graph : Equilibria as function of wmin and wmax
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the initial situation, WA(w,w) −WB(w,w) is also represented (the thick
line). This is useful for subsequent welfare comparisons and for understan-
ding the initial incentives to choose one system rather than another. Here
the difference is increasing in w because A is more favorable to high income
than B. Also it is negative at the mean value w because B is more efficient
than A and W I(w,w) = RIw.
The bottom graph summarizes the equilibrium types as a function of
the range of earnings keeping the mean constant. When the range is small
(wmin > 0.6 and wmax < 1.5), there is only a B-equilibrium : efficiency
effects are dominant. One checks that for these values, at the initial situation,
all citizens in A would prefer system B : the differenceWA(w,w)−WB(w,w)
is negative in the relevant range for w. This is always true as we shall see in
Proposition 2. As the range is increased, we move to the north west and only
the A-equilibrium remains : the redistribution effects become dominant.
4.5 Welfare
In light of these results, one may wonder whether introducing free choice
is beneficial. To avoid considering too many cases, I discuss the situation in
which an I-equilibrium is obtained (i.e. I do not consider anAB-equilibrium).
Then the winners or losers are easily determined. To see this, note that any
w-worker gets an intertemporal wealth equal to W I(w,w). Thus, citizens in
country I are not affected by the reform while in J the losers (resp.winners)
are those for whom the intertemporal wealth W J(w,w) was larger (resp.
smaller) than W I(w,w).
To fix the idea let A be more favorable to high income. Then, using that
W I(w,w) = RIw, the following inequalities hold
(RA −RB)w > WA(w,w)−WB(w,w) for w < w (14)
and (RA −RB)w < WA(w,w)−WB(w,w) for w > w (15)
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If A is not less efficient than B, there is a A-equilibrium only. Also, surely
in country B all citizens whose income is larger than w, are made better off
from (15) since RA−RB ≥ 0. Of course, other citizens are better off, maybe
all if efficiency gains are large enough relative to redistribution effects.
Assume now that A is less efficient than B.
If a B–equilibrium obtains, the opening of the systems is beneficial wi-
thout ambiguity, as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The system the more favorable to high-income can be
eliminated only if, at the initial situation, all individuals are better off with
the other system : If A is more favorable to high-income a B-equilibrium
exists only if
WB(w,w) ≥WA(w,w) for any w in [wmin, wmax], (16)
and thus leads to a (weak) Pareto improvement over the initial situation.
Condition (16) is strong but it is not a sufficient condition for aBequilibrium
to exist. The range of wages must be small enough. Consider the example
again. If 1.5 < wmax < 2.8 and wmin < 0.6, only the A-equilibrium exists,
but B applied to the whole population gives a larger wealth to every one
than A.
Instead, if the A-equilibrium obtains, some B-citizens must lose since the
less efficient system is now in place in country B. In particular, from (14)
and the fact that RA < RB, all workers who earn less than the average wage
are worse off. Since the average wage is typically larger than the median va-
lue, more than a majority of workers in B are made worse off by the reform.
How can this happen ? The dynamics contemplated below helps to unders-
tand this point : Assuming that initially all workers who prefer B choose
it, system A becomes more attractive, which triggers new choices, which
may eventually lead to all choosing A. Actually it can even happen that
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all workers in B are hurt at a A-equilibrium. In that case, implementing B
for everybody would be weakly Pareto improving. This occurs if (16) is met
but the A-equilibrium obtains. This is surely the case if the A-equilibrium
is unique (1.5 < wmax < 2.8 and wmin < 0.6, in the example).
To sum up, even though the model is very simple, the welfare impact
of the opening of the systems largely depends on the situation at hand. If
redistribution losses or gains are too important, there is few chances that a
Pareto improvement will be obtained.
At this point, it is worth comparing our analysis with Casarico (2000). In
two countries with identical economies, compulsory pension systems are in
place, unfunded in one country and fully funded in the other. Redistribution
plays no role (the analysis is conducted with a representative individual in
each country). The paper focuses on the impact of these differences on capi-
tal integration, when capital becomes fully mobile, labor remaining immo-
bile. Production is carried out through a neoclassical production function.
Before capital integration, owing to the different pension systems, invest-
ments, hence their returns, differ in the two countries. Capital integration
has a welfare effect because the return to investment is equalized across
countries. While this effect is clearly absent in our analysis, Casarico does
not allow workers to choose a system. If they could, they would all choose
the more efficient (since there is no redistribution).
5 Dynamics
By keeping the tax rate constant, the balance of a system is ensured
through adjustments in pension benefits. As a result, a system can be
thought of as a defined contribution one. In a correct expectations frame-
work, as just considered, it is also a defined benefit one. It may no longer be
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true under some dynamics. Dynamics are determined by expectations and
information. At the time workers have to choose a system, they are concer-
ned with the wage level of the current and next contributors to each system :
The current ones determine the future redistributive gains or losses within
a system, and the next ones give the level of pension benefits. Starting from
the initial situation in which each system in place in a country is exclusi-
vely for the citizens, I consider here the evolution of the systems driven by
myopic expectations.
Myopic expectations mean that workers at time t, who do not know yet
the choice of their contemporaries and descendants, expect that they will
perform the same choice as the previous generation. For example, initially,
all workers assume the average contributors wage to be identical in each
system, equal to w. A threshold value w∗0 for wages is determined, according
to which all workers with income larger (resp. smaller) than the threshold
choose A (resp. B), still assuming A more favorable to high-income than
B. Afterwards, the evolution of the system is described as follows. Let w∗t−1
be the threshold value between A and B at time t − 1. Workers at time
t observe this value. Under myopic expectations, they expect the choice of
current and next contributors to remain unchanged. Thus, they expect the
average wage level of the current and next contributors to each system to
be given by :
wAt−1 = E[w|w ≥ w∗t−1], wBt−1 = E[w|w ≤ w∗t−1]. (17)
It follows that a w-worker at date t evaluates the wealth generated by
system I as W I(wIt−1, w) defined by (10), and chooses between A and B
accordingly. A new threshold w∗t level is determined, and so on.
Proposition 3 Let system A be more favorable to high-income than B.
Assume myopic expectations. Dynamics converge to
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the (unique) A equilibrium if A is more efficient than B,
in one step to the B− equilibrium if it exists.
Otherwise, assuming that DBE[w|w ≤ x]−DAE[w|w ≥ x] is non-decreasing,
dynamics converge to an equilibrium.
In the first two cases convergence always occurs. Note that theB-equilibrium
Pareto dominates the A-equilibrium if both exist (by Proposition 2). There-
fore a ”good” equilibrium is selected. In other cases, an additional assump-
tion is needed. To understand why, consider the opening of the systems
in which workers choose the systems assuming the same distribution wi-
thin each one. Since those who choose B are less wealthy than those who
choose A, the redistribution within the system B is diminished and within
A increased : more individuals will choose A next period. The monotonicity
assumption ensures that the set of workers who choose A will grow. The
assumption is satisfied if DA is sufficiently low, A bismarckian for instance,
or if wages are uniformly distributed.12
Concluding remarks
Even though the model is too simple in many dimensions, it helps to high-
light some features that are likely to be quite robust. First, the analysis
shows that the system that is preferred by high income workers is not ne-
cessarily the more bismarckian one. Both the levels of the contribution rates
and the efficiency or inefficiency of unfunded systems play an important role.
In particular, in situations in which unfunded are perceived as very ineffi-
cient, the system with the lower contribution rate is preferred. Second, a
12Since A is less efficient and more favorable to high income thanB, both inequalities 0 >
RA−RB > DA−DB hold. Thus the monotonicity condition is met if the slope of E[w|w ≥
x] is not larger than that of E[w|w ≤ x]. This is true for a uniform distribution since the
conditional expectations aare respectively equal to (wmax + x)/2 and (x+ wmin)/2.
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large dispersion of wage earnings eliminates the system the less favorable to
high income even it is the more efficient : the redistribution effects become
dominant for the workers who most benefit from redistribution or those who
are the more penalized by it. Third, free choice does not necessarily lead to
select the more efficient system. In some cases, the new situation may be
pareto dominated by the initial one.
The analysis has been conducted under strong simplifying assumptions.
It should be extended in several directions in order to test the robustness of
the results. First production and endogenous factor prices could be introdu-
ced. Second, uncertainty on production and population growth would make
the comparison between rates of return of the systems less trivial and more
realistic. Liquidity constraints, which are likely to be binding on low income
workers, should be taken into account.
Finally, to incorporate political elements in the analysis would be of
course most interesting. It would require to describe the adjustments of the
systems confronted with the impact of free choice, even if such adjustments
can only be slow. The analysis would then be similar in some aspects to
that of ”fiscal competition” (see for example Epple and Romer (1991), Wil-
dasin (1991)). A basic concern is whether factor mobility, as dictated by the
european construction, necessarily undermines redistributive policies. Not
surprisingly, the literature on taxation between areas -regions, jurisdictions,
countries- and the limitation to redistribution due to the mobility of ca-
pital or labor, is vast and is still growing (see the survey of Cremer and
Pestieau (2002).
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6 Proofs
Recall that under the assumption of stationarity, the wealth of a w-
worker contributing to system I with expectations wI is given by (10) :
W I(wI , w) = RIw +DI(wI − w).
Proof of Proposition 1 Let us determine the conditions under which
there is an active equilibrium with only A. In this case wA = w and
wB = wmin. An equilibrium is obtained if and only if an individual whose
wages are minimum is not incited to choose system B. This is written as
WA(w,wmin) −WB(wmin, wmin) ≥ 0. Using the expression of wealth (10),
this gives the inequality (12).
In a similar way, a situation with only B active forms an equilibrium if an
individual whose wage is maximal is not incited to choose system A. Since
wA = wmax and wB = w, this gives WA(wmax, wmax) −WB(w,wmax) ≤ 0
which yields (13).
It remains to consider an AB-equilibrium. Let the function φ be defined
on [wmin, wmax] by
φ(x) =WA(E[w|w ≥ x], x)−WB(E[w|w ≤ x], x). (18)
By continuity of the distribution of wages, the function φ is continuous. An
equilibrium with two active systems is associated with w∗ in ]wmin, wmax[
that satisfy φ(w∗) = 0. Note that (12) is equivalent to φ(wmin) ≥ 0 and (13)
to φ(wmax) ≤ 0. By continuity of φ it follows that if no I equilibrium exists,
there is an interior w∗ such that φ(w∗) = 0. Similarly, if both equilibria exist
and the inequalities are strict, there is also an AB-equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 2.As just seen, aB-equilibrium exits iffWB(w,wmax)−
WA(wmax, wmax) ≥ 0. Since WA(wmax, wmax) = RAwmax ≥ WA(w,wmax)
(because of the redistribution loss), this givesWB(w,wmax)−WA(w,wmax) ≥
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0 which implies WB(w,w) −WA(w,w) ≥ 0 for any w (because B is less
favorable to high income).
Proof of Proposition 3. To simplify notation, set ∆ = RA−RB−DA+DB.
The assumption that system A is more favorable to high-income than B
writes as ∆ > 0. The choice of a w-worker at t is made on the basis of the
difference in expected wealth
WA(wAt−1, w)−WB(wBt−1, w) = ∆w +DAwAt−1 −DBwBt−1 (19)
where the values wAt−1 are wBt−1 are the average wages of the contributors to
each system observed at time t−1. By positivity of ∆, the function is increa-
sing in w. Thus, all workers whose wage is larger than (DBwBt−1−DAwAt−1)/∆
choose A and the others choose B. If this wage value is larger than wmax,
then everybody chooses A, and if it is smaller than wmin, everybody chooses
B. In order to define the threshold w∗t , it is convenient to consider the pro-
jection P on the interval [wmin, wmax] :
P (x) = wmin if x < wmin,
= x, x ∈ [wmin, wmax],
= wmax if x > wmax.
The threshold w∗t is defined by
w∗t = P
(
(DBwBt−1 −DAwAt−1)/∆
)
. (20)
The values wAt−1 are wBt−1 expected at t are based on observed at time t− 1.
Thus, at the opening of the systems, t = 0, both are equal to the average
wage :
wB−1 = w
A
−1 = w. (21)
and afterwards, t > 0, they satisfy :
wAt−1 = E[w|w ≥ w∗t−1] and wBt−1 = E[w|w ≤ w∗t−1]. (22)
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Conditions (20), (21) and (22) define w∗0 and w∗t as a function of w∗t−1. A
fixed point w∗ of the sequence gives an equilibrium. This is clear if w∗ is in
]wmin, wmax[. Otherwise, say if w∗ = wmax is a fixed point, then knowing
that everybody chooses B at t− 1, everybody makes the same choice at t :
condition (13) is fulfilled and a B-equilibrium is obtained. Similarly, wmin
is a fixed point iff there is an A-equilibrium.
We first prove that w∗t ≤ w∗0 for any t. Note that w∗0 is the threshold
value associated with expectations wA−1 = wB−1 = w. At any subsequent
step, the average wage in A can only been larger and that in B be smaller.
This implies that the incentives to choose A are larger than at the initial
step. Formally note that the inequalities E[w|w ≥ x] ≥ w ≥ E[w|w ≤ x]
hold whatever x. Thus surely wAt−1 ≥ w ≥ wBt−1. Since P is nondecreasing
(20) yields w∗t ≤ w∗0.
Assume first A to be more efficient than B : RA−RB ≥ 0. Since inequa-
lities E[w|w ≥ x] ≥ x ≥ E[w|w ≤ x] always hold, (DBwBt−1 − DAwAt−1) ≤
(DB −DA)w∗t−1. Thus if DB −DA ≤ 0, the argument of P in (20) is nega-
tive : w∗t = wmin whatever t, the (unique) A-equilibrium is obtained at the
opening. If DB −DA > 0, then ∆ ≥ DB −DA ≥ 0 : the argument of P in
(20) is less than w∗t−1. Thus the sequence w∗t decreases as long as it is above
wmin : it converges to the A-equilibrium.
Assume now that a B-equilibrium exists. From Proposition 2, everybody
chooses B initially : w∗0 = wmax. Afterwards, (13) gives w∗1 = wmax : the B-
equilibrium is reached. Conversely, if a B-equilibrium does not exist, surely
w∗1 < wmax : otherwise w∗1 = wmax ≤ w∗0 implies that wmax is a fixed point
of the sequence, namely that there is a B-equilibrium.
Finally, assuming B more efficient than A, consider the situation without
a B-equilibrium. Let the function DBE[w|w ≤ x] − DAE[w|w ≥ x] be
nondecreasing. By induction, using w∗1 ≤ w∗0, the sequence w∗t decreases
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thus converges (since it is bounded). Furthermore, since w∗1 < wmax (because
there is no B-equilibrium), the sequence w∗t converges to a value strictly less
than wmax, that is to an equilibrium of type AB or A.
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